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A mystery has surrounded the 1939 case of Coleman v. Miller. 1 The case concerned the status of the proposed Child Labor Amendment, which Congress had passed in 1924 but which had yet to be ratified by the requisite number of states. In January 1925, the Kansas state legislature had adopted a resolution rejecting the proposed amendment. In January 1937, however, the state senate had divided evenly on a resolution to ratify the amendment, and the state's Lieutenant Governor had cast the deciding vote in favor of ratification. The lower house then adopted a resolution of ratification. Members of the legislature, claiming that the Lieutenant Governor had no right to vote on the senate resolution, brought an action in mandamus seeking to restrain various state officers from taking steps to certify that the legislature had ratified the amendment. The petition also contended that the proposed amendment was stale and no longer subject to ratification because it had not been ratified within a reasonable time. The state supreme court found that the Lieutenant Governor had been entitled to vote on the resolution, that the proposed amendment remained vital and subject to ratification, and that the legislature had ratified the amendment. That court therefore denied the writ of mandamus. 2 The threshold question before the Supreme Court of the United States was whether the Court had jurisdiction over the controversy. More particularly, the issue was whether the members of the state legislature who had brought the action had standing to seek a writ of certiorari. In the published opinion, the Court split on this issue 5-4, with Justices Owen J. Roberts, Hugo L. Black, and William O. Douglas joining Felix Frankfurter's opinion maintaining that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the petitioners lacked standing. 3 The numerical vote had been the same when the Justices met in Conference to deliberate on April 22, 1939 , but the line-up had been different. On that occasion, Justice James C. McReynolds had taken the view that the Court lacked jurisdiction, while Roberts had voted to recognize jurisdiction. These two Justices switched places between the date of the Conference and the announcement of the Court's decision. 4 The second question was whether to affirm the judgment of the state court on the merits. Here the vote in the published decision was 7-2. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes's opinion for the Court held that the question of whether the ratification of the amendment was effective in view of its earlier rejection by the state legislature was a political question to be determined by Congress. 5 Hughes further opined that the question of whether the amendment had lost its vitality through lapse of time was similarly non-justiciable. 6 Roberts, Frankfurter, and Douglas joined Black's concurring opinion, which underscored their view that Congress alone held exclusive power over the political process of constitutional amendment, and that the courts had no business pronouncing upon that process. 7 McReynolds joined Justice Pierce Butler's dissent, which maintained that the proposed amendment was no longer subject to ratification because it had not been ratified within a reasonable time.
Butler's opinion did not speak to the issue of the legislature's previous rejection of the proposed amendment. 8 Here again, however, [o]nly Justices McReynolds and Butler could properly refuse to consider the question; for they voted for the petitioners on other grounds and therefore could have found it unnecessary to pass upon additional reasons supporting the same conclusion. Yet, failing to carry a majority on those grounds, they were under some duty to see whether they could find a majority for their result on any of the other grounds urged.
14 The still-perplexed author was left with a series of questions: "What really did happen? Did a Justice refuse to vote on this issue? And if he did, was it because he could not make up his mind? Or is it possible to saw a Justice vertically in half during a conference and have him walk away whole?" 15 It would be more than half a century before an answer to these questions would find its way into print. In a conversation published in 2007, Boskey related that:
I later found out through Felix
Frankfurter what had really happened in that case. Justice McReynolds, who was a very ornery Justice, used to go off a little bit early before the end of the Term on vacation. And in this particular case, the point involved was a new point that came up after Justice McReynolds had gone off on vacation. And nobody was going to try and call him back-he would have told them, frankly, "Go to hell." He wouldn't have come back. So Hughes just said, "On this issue, the Court is evenly divided." 16 This Frankfurter/Boskey account never has been contradicted, but neither has it been corroborated. As I shall demonstrate, the Justices' papers and contemporary news 37 The Amendment process, Black insisted, was "'political' in its entirety, from submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control, or interference at any point." 38 Hughes's draft opinion made clear that he disagreed with Black, Roberts, Frankfurter, and Douglas on the question of the justiciability of the issue of the Lieutenant Governor's eligibility, and it appears that Stone and Justice Stanley Reed agreed with him. Justice Butler's dissenting opinion closed by observing that the question of whether the issue of the proposed amendment's vitality was nonjusticiable "was not raised by the parties or by the United States appearing as amicus curiae." Neither had that question been suggested by the Court when it ordered re-argument. It therefore would be inappropriate, Butler opined, "without hearing argument on the point," to hold that the Court lacked power to decide the question of whether the amendment was no longer subject to ratification. 39 Though his opinion did not speak to the issue of the Lieutenant Governor's eligibility, Butler -on the threshold question of standing. But having thus disposed of the merits on the ground that the proposed amendment was no longer subject to ratification, McReynolds might not have thought it necessary or proper to reach the issue of the Lieutenant Governor's eligibility. Indeed, the fact that Butler's dissenting opinion also did not speak to the issue of the Kansas legislature's previous rejection of the proposed 
